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Lecture
Marriage Licenses*
Mary Anne Caset
Like a marriage license itself, the title of this Lockhart
Lecture can have a variety of meanings. I intend it first and
foremost to be read as a complete sentence in the present tense:
subject, "marriage"; verb, "licenses." A central theme I shall
address is the variety of ways over time and at present mar-
* This piece is based on the 2004-2005 William B. Lockhart Lecture, de-
livered at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 26, 2004. The
lectureship is named in honor of William B. Lockhart, who served as Dean of
the University of Minnesota Law School from 1956 until 1972. The author is
grateful to Dean Alex Johnson for his invitation and to members of the audi-
ence and Minnesota Law School faculty for their comments. Portions of this
paper were also presented at an AALS panel on Cohabitation After Marvin; a
Harvard Law School conference on Freedom to Marry; the Second Annual
Women Law Students Conference at the University of Wisconsin; a University
of Chicago Legal Forum conference on The Public and Private Faces of Family
Law; a Washington University workshop on Work, Family, and Public Policy;
an AHA panel on Churching the State; the University of Chicago's Law and
Philosophy Workshop; a LAPA workshop at Princeton; the Subversive Lega-
cies Conference at the University of Texas; faculty workshops at Emory, Hous-
ton, North Carolina, and Washington and Lee; and, as part of a project with
my former colleague Paul Mahoney on The Role of the State in Marriage and
Corporations, at an NYU Legal History Workshop, a Columbia Feminism and
Legal Theory Workshop, and a summer workshop at the University of Vir-
ginia. The author remains grateful to Paul for his collaboration; to partici-
pants in those events for their comments; to Susan Appleton, Douglas Baird,
David Dunn Bauer, Mary Bonauto, Brian Bix, George Chauncey, David Cur-
rie, Charlie Donahue, Frank Easterbrook, Liz Emens, Martha Fineman, Dan
Fischel, Suzanne Goldberg, E.J. Graff, Philip Hamburger, Dirk Hartog, Jill
Hasday, Dick Helmholz, Nan Hunter, Andy Koppelman, Lyo Louis-Jacques,
Linda McClain, Todd Preuss, Linda Przybyszewski, Julie Roin, Sharon Ruiz,
Margaret Schilt, Bill Schwesig, Buffie Scott, David Strauss, Mary Kearny
Stroube, Winnie Sullivan, Cass Sunstein, Kathryn Tanner, Lisa Van Alstyne,
Walter Wadlington, and John Witte for brainstorming and bibliographic help;
and to Virginia Kim, Jeremy Mallory, Abby Moncrieff, and Corey Perry for re-
search assistance. Research support for this project came from the Arnold and
Frieda Shure Research Fund of the University of Chicago and the Class of
1966 Research Professorship of the University of Virginia.
t Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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riage has been seen to license participants in the institution. Of
course, the title can also be read as a plural noun, referring to
more than one, or more than one kind of, marriage license, the
document once defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "permis-
sion granted by public authority to persons who intend to in-
termarry, usually addressed to the minister or magistrate who
is to perform the ceremony [and] ... in most jurisdictions . ..
made an essential prerequisite to the lawful solemnization of
marriage."'
A plurality of marriage licenses have been in the news
lately. Over the course of the past year alone, these include, in
addition to the two licenses issued to singer Britney Spears, the
thousands issued to same-sex couples-more than 4000 during
the so-called Winter of Love initiated in San Francisco by
Mayor Gavin Newsom just before Valentine's Day 2004; nearly
3000 in Multnomah County, Oregon; a handful in places like
New Paltz, New York and Sandoval County, New Mexico; an
unknown number to American citizens in Canada; and, since
May 17, 2004, nearly 5000 to Massachusetts residents and at
least a half dozen to nonresidents in the Bay State. These also
represent a plurality of kinds of marriage licenses, for some
simply because there is seen to be a difference in kind between
licenses issued to a couple consisting of a female and a male as
bride and groom and one issued to couples whose two members
are of the same sex, who present themselves instead as "first
applicant and second applicant."2 There is also a distinction to
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 877 (5th ed. 1979).
2. I myself incline to the view articulated by Evan Wolfson that what all
these same-sex couples were seeking license to obtain was not "something
lesser or different" called "gay marriage" or "same-sex marriage" but simply
"marriage... with the same duties, dignity, security, and expression of love
and equality as [their] non-gay brothers and sisters have." See, e.g., EVAN
WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY AND GAY PEOPLE'S
RIGHT To MARRY 17 (2004). Yet I must concede that even those male or female
couples in Massachusetts married pursuant to valid licenses have not yet
achieved their goal of simply marriage, that there remains a difference in kind
between their marriage licenses and those of male-female couples, so long as
the Defense of Marriage Act is enforced so as to deny all federal recognition to
their marriages and other states are also free to disregard them. Cf. In re
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572-75 (Mass. 2004)
(Sosman, J., dissenting) (finding, contrary to the opinion of a majority of the
Supreme Judicial Court, that there was a rational basis for denying the title
"marriage" and instead applying the proposed title "civil union" to state-
licensed unions of same-sex couples "when the obligations they are undertak-
ing and the benefits they are receiving are, in practical effect, so very differ-
ent" from those of opposite-sex married couples due to the fact that the federal
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be drawn between licenses authorized by and issued in confor-
mity with state law and those issued in contravention of the
law on the books. Thus, whatever else critics of same-sex cou-
ples who were married in their home state of Massachusetts on
or after May 17, 2004 may say, the critics can no longer claim
that the licenses issued to these couples are not valid under
state law.3 By contrast, the licenses issued to same-sex couples
in California and Oregon were declared invalid by the supreme
courts4 of their respective states. 5
Doubtless among the thousands of these licenses are as
well plural licenses issued to members of a single couple, who,
like a couple of Midwestern women who traveled to San Fran-
cisco to marry, "plan on going from state to state collecting
marriage licenses 'like wallpaper' until one sticks." 6 This Lec-
government and "most States will refuse to recognize a 'marriage' license is-
sued by Massachusetts to a same-sex couple").
3. A final challenge to Massachusetts's issuance of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples was put to rest when the U.S. Supreme Court denied review
of the claim, previously rejected by the First Circuit, that, in Goodridge v. De-
partment of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court had violated the State's guaranteed federal constitu-
tional right to a republican form of government. See Largess v. Supreme Judi-
cial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 618
(2004).
4. See Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 488 (Cal.
2004); Li v. State, CC 0403-03057 et al., 2005 WL 852319, at *10 (Or. Apr. 14,
2005). It is important to note that the Lockyer and Li decisions were both lim-
ited to questions of institutional competence over the issuing of marriage li-
censes. Neither the California nor the Oregon Supreme Court has yet ad-
dressed the issue of the constitutionality of the state's denial of licenses to
same-sex couples. On March 14, 2005, San Francisco County Superior Court
Judge Richard Kramer, citing, inter alia, Perez v. Sharpe, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal.
1948), the groundbreaking California miscegenation case, held that to deny
same-sex couples license to marry violated their right to equal protection un-
der the state constitution. See In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title
[Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, *9-12 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
5. Still sub judice are the handful of licenses issued by Massachusetts
municipalities to out-of-state couples who express no intention of moving to
the State. See, e.g., Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 042656G, 2004
WL 2075557 (Mass. Sup. Aug. 18, 2004) (considering the challenge by an out-
of-state same-sex couple to a 1913 state law applied to restrict their ability to
obtain licenses and enter into valid marriages in Massachusetts).
6. Marc Hansen, Question of Rights for Wed-Unwed Gay Couple, DES
MOINES REG., Oct. 30, 2004, at 1B (quoting Emily Renaud and Sara Graham,
Drake students whose first marriage license was "one of more than 4,000
granted in San Francisco" and subsequently invalidated by the California Su-
preme Court), available at http://desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20041030/OPINIONO1/410300321 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
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ture will focus on one famous example of multiple licenses
sought by members of a single same-sex couple, not last year,
but over thirty years ago, and not in San Francisco or Province-
town or Portland, but in Hennepin County and then in Blue
Earth County, Minnesota.
The couple in question, Jack Baker and Michael McCon-
nell, could have been typical audience members at a Lockhart
Lecture. At the time they first sought to be legally married,
Baker was a law student at the University of Minnesota Law
School, of which Lockhart was then Dean, and McConnell,
whom Baker had met when both were graduate students in
Oklahoma and who had been his partner for three and a half
years, had just accepted a job as head of cataloging at the Uni-
versity's St. Paul campus library. 7 On the day McConnell
moved to Minneapolis to join Baker, May 18, 1970,8 the two
applied for a marriage license in Hennepin County, where they
resided. Their application was accepted by the clerk, Gerald
Nelson, but, on advice of counsel, he declared himself "unable
to issue the marriage license" because "sufficient legal impedi-
ment lies thereto prohibiting the marriage of two male per-
sons."9 The couple applied for a writ of mandamus to require
that a license be issued, but, on January 8, 1971, a state dis-
trict judge instead "specifically ordered [Nelson] not to issue a
marriage license to the petitioners." 10 Thereafter, the couple
pursued a two-track strategy toward licensing their marriage.
On one track, they appealed the denial to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which, in an en banc opinion filed October 15,
1971, held first, that Minnesota Statute section 517 governing
marriage did "not authorize marriage between persons of the
same sex and that such marriages are accordingly prohibited" 11
7. See Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810
(1972) (No. 71-1027); Jack Star, The Homosexual Couple, LOOK, Jan. 26, 1971,
at 69.
8. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, McConnell v. Anderson, 405 U.S.
1046 (1972) (No. 71-978). Coincidentally this was almost to the day sixteen
years after the Supreme Court's first decision in Brown v. Board on May 17,
1954 and thirty-four years before the first marriage licenses were issued to
same-sex couples in Massachusetts pursuant to the Goodridge decision on
May 17, 2004. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d 941.
9. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Baker (No. 71-1027).
10. Order of Judge Tom Bergin of Hennepin County Quashing the Writ,
Jurisdictional Statement at 12a-13a, Baker (No. 71-1027).
11. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 810 (1972).
2005] 1761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and second, that 'Minn. St. c. 517 does not offend the First,
Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution,"12 and that Griswold v. Connecticut and
Loving v. Virginia "upon which petitioners.., rely [do] not
militate against this conclusion."13 According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court:
The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is
as old as the book of Genesis .... This historic institution manifestly
is more deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept of
marriage and societal interests for which petitioners contend. The due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for re-
structuring it by judicial legislation.14
In response to the petitioners' Equal Protection claim, the court
said, "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a
clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely
upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in
sex."
15
On the other track, in early August 1971, the couple ob-
tained an order from Judge Lindsay Arthur of the Hennepin
County Juvenile Court "granting the legal adoption" of Baker
by McConnell, permitting Baker "to change his name from
Richard John Baker to Pat Lynn McConnell."16 On August 16,
in Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minnesota, Michael McCon-
nell alone applied for a marriage license for himself and Baker,
under his new adoptive name. 17 The "bisexual name of Pat
12. Id. at 187. The couple's Eighth Amendment claim, which the Minne-
sota Supreme Court "dismiss[ed] without discussion," id. at 186 n.2, began
with the premise that "if one of the[m] ... became a female by way of a surgi-
cal operation altering the sex organs, the appellants would then be able to
marry each other" and argued that "[t]he mandate by the State that one of the
appellants have his penis cut off before issuance of a marriage license is 'con-
duct that shocks the conscience."' Appellants' Brief at 53-54, Baker (No.
43009).
13. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
14. Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 187.
16. Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6 n.3, Baker (No. 71-1027). Adoption,
which created a legal relationship more indissoluble than marriage, was a
route other same-sex couples attempted to use to formalize their ties as a fam-
ily. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984)
(denying petition for adoption filed by adult male couple who had "resided to-
gether continuously for more than 25 years" in a "homosexual relationship" on
grounds that legal adoption proceedings in New York were "plainly not a
quasi-matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with a legal impri-
matur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or homosexual").
17. Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6 n.3, Baker (No. 71-1027). Minnesota
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Lynn McConnell doubtless kept the clerk from making any in-
quiry about the sexes of the parties."18 But, after Judge Arthur
made public the adoption, the County Attorney of Blue Earth
realized it had issued a marriage license to two males and "de-
clared the license void on statutory grounds" on August 31.19
Nevertheless, on September 3, 1971, Baker and McConnell
were married in a private ceremony by a Methodist minister
and the following week the duly executed license was sent for
filing to Blue Earth County.20
Because of publicity surrounding the first license applica-
tion, the Regents of the University of Minnesota, after a hear-
ing, determined not to approve McConnell's appointment at the
library. He appealed this determination all the way through
the federal courts, receiving a favorable decision from the dis-
trict judge which was reversed on appeal and denied review by
the Supreme Court. 21 Baker and McConnell also sought Su-
preme Court review of the Minnesota Supreme Court decision
concerning their marriage license, but, on October 10, 1972, the
Supreme Court dismissed their appeal "for want of a substan-
tial federal question."22
This was by no means the end of Baker and McConnell's ef-
forts through litigation to have their marriage legally recog-
nized. Baker's claim for increased veterans' "benefits for the pe-
riod from September 27, 1971, to June 15, 1972, on grounds
that McConnell was his dependent spouse" 23 was rejected in
1976 by the Eighth Circuit, which agreed with the Veterans'
Administration that 'McConnell was not the spouse of veteran
Statute section 517.07 (1971) required that a license be obtained from "the
county in which the woman resides, or, if not a resident of this state" then
from any county. It is not clear on what basis the couple believed that Blue
Earth County was an appropriate county for them to obtain a license. The
adoption itself would not, at the time, have presented a legal obstacle to the
marriage. Although the current version of Minnesota Statute section 517.03
prohibits "marriage between an ancestor and a descendant ... by adoption,"
the rule in effect before 1978 limited the prohibition to those related by "the
half or whole blood." Compare MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2004), with MINN. STAT.
§ 517.03 (1976).
18. Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6 n.3, Baker (No. 71-1027).
19. Id.
20. Id.; KAY TOBIN & RANDY WICKER, THE GAY CRUSADERS 150 (1972).
21. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814-15 (D. Minn. 1970),
rev'd 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
22. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
23. McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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Baker"24 because federal law looked to state law-here Minne-
sota's-to determine "the validity of appellants' purported mar-
riage." Baker v. Nelson had decided that issue adversely to the
couple,25 moreover "the Supreme Court's dismissal of the ap-
peal... constitute[d] an adjudication of the merits which is
binding on the lower federal courts," so that the couple, having
"had their day in court" were "collaterally estopped."26 Then, on
the thirty-fourth anniversary of their initial application for a
marriage license, the couple filed suit to contest the IRS rejec-
tion of an amended tax return for the year 2000, amended to
change McConnell's marital status from "unmarried individual"
to "married, filing jointly" and seeking a refund of $793.28.27 In
January 2005, a federal district judge affirmed the decision by
the IRS and a federal magistrate to deny the claim, inter alia
on grounds of claim preclusion resulting from the 1976 Eighth
Circuit case, to which the IRS had at one time been a party.28
I shall return to more specific details of the history of
Baker and McConnell's marriage licenses later in the Lecture
and use them as jumping off points for discussion. Because the
couple's litigation history encapsulates virtually the full range
of GLBTQ29 rights issues, it helps illuminate not only how mar-
riage licenses for same-sex couples are connected to broader
constitutional commitments against sex discrimination, the es-
tablishment of religion, and unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into intimate decisions; but also how inextricably they can
be linked to claims by gay men and lesbians to employment
nondiscrimination and equality in other benefits and obliga-
tions of citizens, from taxation to military service.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186, 187).
26. Id. at 56.
27. See McConnell v. United States, No. CIV.04-2711, 2005 WL 19458, at
*1-3 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005). In his brief for McConnell, Baker did not simply
argue that "we are still married," cf. GARRISON KEILLOR, WE ARE STILL
MARRIED (1990), but rather that the receipt of a 'lawful license to marry [from
Blue Earth County] ... gave rise to a contract to which the government is a
third party benefactor." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objections to
the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, McConnell (Civil
No. 04-2711), 2004 WL 3014486. According to the couple, "a lawful license
gives rise to a special relationship that is recognized by the U.S. Constitution.
Whether it is called a marriage or a civil union or a rose is beside the point."
Id.
28. McConnell, 2005 WL 19458, at *2-4.
29. Gay/LesbianfBisexual/Transgender/Queer or Questioning.
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First I want to examine more generally the ways in which
the institution of civil marriage functions as a licensing scheme
and the things marriage licenses. I will do this in part by draw-
ing analogies to the licensing the state provides for the drivers
of automobiles and the owners of dogs and, most importantly,
to its provision of corporate charters. In all four of these cases,
the underlying activities involved could be and were at times
carried on without state involvement, but the state at one point
asserted monopoly control over licensing and, because, inter
alia, of efficiency advantages from its involvement, the state is
unlikely to retreat completely from the field.
Marriage has always licensed, but what marriage licenses
has changed over time. Marriage once licensed a husband's
control over his wife, her body, and the products of her labor,
from the children she bore to her earnings and property.30 Mar-
riage was also once the exclusive means of licensing sex and all
that went with it-procreation, cohabitation, and the control of
children. While it once bound couples together indissolubly for
life in a heavily regulated status relationship, virtually all of
whose terms were mandatory and imposed by the state, mar-
riage now licenses in a new way-a married couple is by and
large free to have or not have sex, vaginal or not, procreative,
contracepted, or otherwise; to be faithful or not, to divorce and
remarry, to commingle their finances or keep them separate, to
live together or separately, to differentiate roles or share all
tasks, to publicize their relationship or be discreet about it,
while still having their commitment to one another recognized
by third parties including the state.3 1
30. See CAROLINE NORTON, CAROLINE NORTON'S DEFENSE: ENGLISH
LAWS FOR WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Joan Huddleston ed., 1982)
(polemic supporting law reform by wife whose husband, after suing unsuccess-
fully for divorce, seized her earnings and denied her access to her children).
31. This is true even under the immigration laws, although immigration
authorities are authorized to investigate a couple's bona fides in marrying and
look beyond the formal legal validity of their marriage before granting spousal
benefits. See, e.g., Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975). As the Ninth
Circuit explained:
The concept of establishing a life as marital partners contains no fed-
eral dictate about the kind of life that the partners may choose to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their life styles, such as prescribing the
amount of time they must spend together, or designating the manner
in which either partner elects to spend his or her time, in the guise of
specifying the requirements of a bona fide marriage would raise seri-
ous constitutional questions. Aliens cannot be required to have more
conventional or more successful marriages than citizens.
Id. at 1201 (citations omitted).
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The state has been a relative latecomer in the regulation of
marriage, however, and, Henry Maine to the contrary notwith-
standing, the history of marriage in Anglo-American law seems
thus far to have been one of movement from contract to status
and only part way back again. Legal historians have noted that
the earliest English laws concerning marriage treat it as, in ef-
fect, a contract for the purchase of a wife, a purely private
transaction, with "no trace of any such thing as public license
or registration; no authoritative intervention of priest or other
public functionary. It is purely a private business transac-
tion."32 Moreover, such control as was exercised was in the
hands of the Church and the canon law, not the state. Even as
the Church sought, in the high middle ages, to increase its con-
trol over marriage, however, canon law resoundingly endorsed
marriage's fundamentally private and contractual character,
with Pope Alexander III declaring it to be the law of the Church
that "a contract by words of present consent" sufficed to form a
valid marriage. Nothing further, in particular no public cere-
mony of any kind, was necessary for the marriage's validity; al-
though formalities such as the publication of banns and the
blessing of a priest were required to make a marriage fully licit
and a couple could be punished for failure to observe these for-
malities.33
32. 1 GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS 285 (1904).
33. Alexander III's canon law is the ancestor of what in the United States
today is called common law marriage, in which a couple holding themselves
out as married are treated (under the law of a shrinking minority of states) as
legally married for all intents and purposes, notwithstanding their failure to
undergo the formalities (e.g., obtaining a license) ordinarily required by law.
After a period of disfavor, common law marriage has recently attracted more
favorable reviews from legal academics. Cynthia Bowman, for example, has
published A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR.
L. REV. 709 (1996), claiming that it better protects women's expectations. The
modern term "common law marriage" is somewhat misleading, given that
canon law marriage as defined by Alexander III was precisely not marriage at
common law and would often not suffice to give members of a couple the rights
and obligations the common law extended to married people. From the Nor-
man conquest on down, greater observance of formalities, and, increasingly
over time, greater involvement by the state, was generally required to make a
marriage fully a marriage for purposes of the common law. This divergence
between legality and validity remained an important theme for English mar-
riage law in the medieval and early modern period. Complying with all the
formalities so as to make one's marriage fully legal as well as valid was much
like obtaining a charter from the state-while initially not required, it pro-
vided certain advantages at the price of certain restrictions. Thus, for exam-
ple, only with a charter could a corporation obtain monopoly status and only
1766 [89:1758
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When, the English state finally and definitively asserted
control over marriage, it did so through its Established Church.
The first systematic reform of English marriage laws, the 1753
Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, popu-
larly known as Lord Hardwicke's Act after the Lord Chancellor
who shepherded it through Parliament, represented the apex of
the English state's assertion of monopoly control over the for-
mation of marriage. 34 The Act declared null and void all mar-
riages not preceded by the issue of an official ecclesiastical li-
cense or by the calling of banns in the Anglican church 35 of the
parish where one of the marriage partners had resided for a
specified period. It required that marriages be witnessed and
set forth detailed requirements for their entry in specially pre-
pared marriage registers.36 Most violation of the Act's provi-
sions by a clergyman was made a felony subject to fourteen
years deportation to the colonies, but falsification of a marriage
register subjected offenders to the death penalty. 37 Each one of
these provisions was designed to remedy perceived abuses in
the application of the law of marriage over the preceding cen-
tury. The eighteenth century also saw a rise in state control
over the dissolution of marriage paralleling attempts to achieve
similar results far more simply and cheaply by private contract
of separation. 38
At the time Hardwicke's Act first made a marriage license
an obligatory precondition for a valid marriage in England, a
predominant view of what it was that marriage licensed was
contemporaneously set forth by William Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England.39 On this view, a mar-
with a formally and publicly solemnized marriage in facie ecclesiae could a
wife obtain dower rights at common law.
34. See Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages, 1753, 26
Geo. 2, ch. 33 (Eng.).
35. See id. § 8. Thus the state's monopoly power was put, not in secular
hands, but in the hands of its Established Church. Special provisions were
made for the marriage of Quakers and Jews, but none for those of Catholics,
Dissenters, or non-Christians. See id. § 18.
36. Not only was the form of words for individual entries specified, but the
quality of the paper, the manner of numbering the pages, and the requirement
that every numbered page "be ruled with lines at proper and equal distances
from each other." See id. § 14.
37. See id. §§ 8, 16.
38. A fuller account appears in Mary Anne Case & Paul Mahoney, The
Role of the State in Corporations and Marriage, an unpublished paper on file
with the author.
39. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ch. 15, Of Husband and
176720051
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riage license could be seen to have functioned, in ways loosely
analogous to a modern dog license, as something like a certifi-
cate of ownership of the wife, entitling the husband to her
property, her body and its products, including the labor she en-
gaged in for wages and the labor that produced offspring;40
obliging him to provide for her care and feeding;41 giving him a
cause of action against those who injured her or his interest in
her; making him responsible for her actions and giving him the
right to control her.42 She did not have the same rights over
and duties to him, although she was obliged to provide him
domestic services and sexual access and to share his resi-
dence. 43 Just as dog licenses require that the animal wear a col-
lar and tag with its owner's name, so, as late as the 1970s,
many U.S. states required by law that a wife take her hus-
band's name; she was obliged to be known after marriage as
Mrs. Husband's Name, and customarily always wore a wedding
ring. A husband did not ordinarily take his wife's name, or in-
dicate his marital status in his name or title in any way; nor, in
much of U.S. society for long periods of history, did husbands
tend to wear wedding rings. 44 This asymmetry of roles, duties,
and privileges in law, although on the decline since at least the
passage of the first Married Women's Property Acts in the mid-
nineteenth century, remained, as will be discussed further be-
low, very much a part of the legal landscape when Baker and
McConnell first applied for a marriage license, and presented
real obstacles to the recognition of their marriage.
In at least two other respects also relevant to Baker and
McConnell's application for one, a marriage license can be seen
Wife.
40. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 30. For an analysis of similarities in at-
titudes toward pets, slaves, and wives, see Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80
CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
41. Compare the doctrine of necessaries, under which a husband's obliga-
tion could be terminated through a notice placed in the papers concerning a
wife who had run away. See, e.g., HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY 156, 157 (2000) (describing the husband's obligation to
support his wife).
42. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at ch. 15.
43. See, e.g., People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (Just. Ct. 2004)
('"The inferior [the wife] hath no kind of property in the company, care or assis-
tance of the superior [the husband] as the superior is held to have in those of
the inferior." (quoting Van Allen v. Allen, 159 N.E. 656, 658 (N.Y. 1927) (quot-
ing 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *143))).
44. See generally, e.g., Joan S. Kohout, The Right of Women To Use Their
Maiden Names, 38 ALB. L. REV. 105 (1973).
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as analogous to a driver's license. 45 First, just as the precondi-
tion for the lawful operation of a motor vehicle is these days or-
dinarily the possession of a valid driver's license, so, until quite
recently, a valid marriage was the prerequisite to engaging
lawfully in most any form of sexual activity: while marriage li-
censed a husband's sexual access to his wife (unconstrained
even by the law of rape), criminal laws prohibited fornication
and adultery (i.e., nonmarital and extramarital vaginal inter-
course), homosexual and heterosexual oral and anal sex, besti-
ality, even access to masturbatory aids and pornographic mate-
rials. Marriage was also seen as a prerequisite to licensed
cohabitation, with both criminal laws and zoning ordinances
prohibiting unmarried persons from sharing a dwelling. Today,
although not yet in 1970, every constitutionally recognized as-
pect of liberty legal marriage formerly monopolized (sex, co-
habitation, reproduction, parenting, etc.) seems, as a matter of
constitutional right, no longer within the state's or marriage's
monopoly control.46
Although Baker and McConnell steadfastly resisted any at-
tempt to reduce their relationship to the sex or their marriage
license to a necessary license to engage in otherwise prohibited
sexual activity, 47 it is important to remember that, at the time
they first sought to marry, Griswold had given married couples
license to engage in constitutionally protected non-procreative
sex, but Eisenstadt v. Baird48 had not yet extended that liberty
to unmarried persons. In Minnesota at the time, consensual
sodomy was a criminal offense, a fact the Regents of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota stressed in the litigation over McConnell's
job in their library. Their lawyer sought to question McConnell
45. Of course, drivers' licenses require a minimum demonstrable level of
knowledge and skill, something not now generally required of applicants for
marriage licenses, despite efforts in some states to institute mandatory pre-
marital counseling. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every
Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the
Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993) (reporting on surveys
indicating low level of knowledge of marriage laws among recently married
Virginia couples); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-33 (2004).
46. For further discussion, see Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and 'That" in
Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 137-41 (2003).
47. See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at 13, Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971) (No. 43009) ("[A]ny argument that a marriage license is state-
granted permission for sexual activity is groundless. The conclusion is that the
license will neither encourage nor deter sexual activity."); see also infra note
127 and accompanying text.
48. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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in detail as to his sexual practices, as well as asking, "What ac-
tivity is it that you could pursue in marriage that you don't do
now?"49 "On cross-examination he denied that he had ever
practiced or committed the crime of sodomy within the state of
Minnesota, though he is presently living at the same address as
his intended 'spouse."' 50 As Georgia Attorney General Michael
Bowers was to do with Robin Shahar a quarter century later,51
the Regents sought to draw an unbreakable connection between
announcing one's desire to marry someone of the same-sex,
sodomy, and unsuitability for public employment.
A marriage license, like a driver's license, also has taken
on functions far removed from its central core of authorizing
the holder to engage in potentially dangerous, heavily regu-
lated activities. Because a driver's license today facilitates ac-
tivities as diverse and far removed from operating a motor ve-
hicle as boarding a commercial airplane, cashing a check, and
purchasing an alcoholic beverage, even those who rarely get
49. Appendix at 79, McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971)
(No. 20583).
50. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D. Minn. 1970). At the
time, Minnesota Statute section 609.293 defined sodomy as "carnally knowing
any person by the anus or by or with the mouth." MINN. STAT. § 609.293
(1967). As Baker and McConnell pointed out in their Minnesota Supreme
Court brief, "not all sexual acts are proscribed in all states. In Minnesota, for
example, it is not illegal for two persons to indulge in mutual masturbation."
Appellants' Brief at 12, Baker (No. 43009).
51. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.17 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (upholding Georgia Attorney General's withdrawal of job offer from law-
yer for participating in Jewish lesbian wedding ceremony intended to have
only religious, not legal validity, because it "could undermine confidence about
the Attorney General's commitment to enforce the State's law against homo-
sexual sodomy (or laws limiting marriage and marriage benefits to traditional
marriages)"). Attorney General Bowers testified in a deposition that "the natu-
ral consequence of a marriage is some sort of sexual conduct, I would think to
most people, and if it's homosexual it would have to be sodomy." Memorandum
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Shahar v.
Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF) (quoting
Bowers Deposition at 80-81). See Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in
the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1659 (1993). The question of marriage
was also interwoven with the question of public employment for another early
gay rights litigant, John Singer. Compare Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,
1194-97 (1974) (rejecting claim that state ERA prevented denial of marriage
license to a same-sex couple), with Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d
247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976) (upholding Singer's discharge from a job at the EEOC
because of his "openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual way of life," inter
alia by applying for a marriage license). For further discussion of the Singer
case, see Case, supra note 46, at 102-04.
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behind the wheel of a car frequently find it useful to possess a
driver's license. Similarly, explaining why he wished to marry,
Baker said, "[t]he institution of marriage has been used by the
legal system as a distribution mechanism for many rights and
privileges [which] can be obtained only through a legal mar-
riage."52 On Baker's list were "inheritance rights, property
privileges [and] tax benefits,"53 all provided directly by the
state.5 4 He might have added a host of rights and privileges
nongovernmental actors, sometimes under state compulsion,
provide on account of marriage, from insurance benefits for
employees' spouses, to spousal privileges at institutions rang-
ing from hospitals and nursing homes to country clubs and
automobile rental agencies. As Paula Ettelbrick observed, mar-
riage "has become a facile mechanism for employers to dole out
benefits, for businesses to provide special deals and incentives,
and for the law to make distinctions in distributing meager
public funds."55 Just as a valid driver's license will help get you
onto a plane even if you have not driven in thirty years, so "a
simple certificate of the state, regardless of whether the
spouses love, respect, or even see each other on a regular basis,
dominates and is supported."56
Like many other supporters of gay rights critical of an em-
phasis by gay and lesbian couples on achieving entry into the
legal institution of marriage as it is currently constructed, Et-
telbrick would prefer, not only for benefits to be disaggregated
52. DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS 284 (1971). Like Paula Ettelbrick
and myself, see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text, Baker did not ap-
prove of piling benefits onto couples merely because they were married. Al-
though he would have preferred tax breaks to be given only to couples
"straight or gay, who are actually raising children," and not to "childless het-
erosexual married couples," he insisted that "if society refuses to do that, then
Michael and I are going to get in on couples' tax breaks too." TOBIN & WICKER,
supra note 20, at 145.
53. TEAL, supra note 52, at 284.
54. As noted above, Baker and McConnell ultimately sought to use their
marriage license to obtain veterans' as well as tax benefits. See supra notes
23-28 and accompanying text.
55. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 721, 724 (2d ed.
1997). I share Ettelbrick's opposition to the extent to which benefits, particu-
larly those provided through an employer, are accorded on the basis, not of
need or desert, but of mere marital status. See Mary Anne Case, How High the
Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the Bur-
den of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1763-
67 (2001).
56. Ettelbrick, supra note 55, at 724.
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from marital status, but also for there to be increased legal rec-
ognition of other forms of relationship, notably domestic part-
nership.57 As a theoretical matter, I share this desire for recog-
nition of a variety of supportive family forms offering persons of
all sexes and orientations the opportunity to structure their
families and live their lives as best suits them. But as a practi-
cal matter, I must observe that the "many lesbian and gay
families who do not, and never will, fit neatly into the marriage
model"58 are even less likely to fit into existing domestic part-
nership models or any other currently accepted "functional"
model of the family. As compared with most current alterna-
tives and competitors in the United States, from registered do-
mestic partnership under the auspices of states like California
and New Jersey, to ascriptive domestic partnership as proposed
by the American Law Institute (ALI),59 to functional family
definitions such as those adopted by courts like the New York
Court of Appeals, 60 marriage in many respects licenses greater
flexibility and less state intrusion into family life.61
For good, as well as for ill,62 marriage now licenses couples
to structure their lives as best suits them without losing recog-
nition for their relationship. Some may find it disturbing that a
couple that does not "even see each other on a regular basis" is
still licensed by marriage to receive a host of benefits or that
''marriage laws do not condition receipt of public and private
financial benefits to married couples on a demonstration of fi-
nancial dependence on each other; the benefits are available to
married individuals regardless of whether they mingle their fi-
nances or actually depend on each other for support."63 Al-
though I find it unfortunate that so many public and private
benefits depend on marriage, I, by contrast, find much that is
57. See id. at 725 ('The domestic partnership movement has been an im-
portant part of this progress .... ).
58. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay
Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 109 (1996).
59. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 36-37, §§ 6.02, 6.05, 6.06 (2000).
60. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989)
(granting rent control succession rights to survivor of a gay couple the court
found had "all of the normal familial characteristics").
61. This is a claim I first made in Couples and Coupling. Case, supra note
51, at 1664-66.
62. Cf. Ettelbrick, supra note 55, 1756-57; Ettelbrick, supra note 58, 122-
30.
63. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 946 (Mass. 2003).
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good in the fact that a marriage certificate now allows hetero-
sexual couples to have an open marriage, 64 to live in different
cities or in different apartments in the same city, to structure
their finances as they please, without having their commitment
or the legal benefits that follow from it challenged.
Although married couples need no longer behave like
Baron and Feme to be recognized, the same license is not given
to same-sex couples under most of the domestic partnership
schemes now available legislatively, judicially, administra-
tively, or from private firms or organizations such as employ-
ers.65 Consider, for example, the requirements for domestic
partnership California and New Jersey now impose as a pre-
condition for according to those eligible same-sex couples and
elderly heterosexual couples that register many, but not all, the
benefits of legal marriage. Both states require that "both per-
sons [in the partnership] have a common residence" 66 and that
both persons agree to be jointly responsible for each other's ba-
sic living expenses during the domestic partnership. New Jer-
sey in addition requires that both persons "are otherwise jointly
responsible for each other's common welfare as evidenced by
joint financial arrangements or joint ownership of real or per-
sonal property,"67 and it prohibits the partners from "mod-
ify[ing] the rights and obligations to each other" that it has de-
fined as "requirements for a domestic partnership."68 Although,
until recently, the comparative license granted married couples
64. At least in those jurisdictions that do not prosecute adultery.
65. Civil unions in Vermont and Connecticut, by contrast to most domes-
tic partnership schemes, are not more restrictive in their requirements than
marriage; under the laws of these two states, civil union and marriage are
procedurally and substantively virtually identical.
66. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(1) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-
4(b)(1) (West 2004). California defines domestic partners as "two adults who
have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed rela-
tionship of mutual caring." CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2005). By contrast,
marriage is defined as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract be-
tween a man and a woman," id. § 300, and those eligible to marry are de-
scribed only as "[a]n unmarried male ... and an unmarried female of the age
of 18 years or older, and not otherwise disqualified," id. § 301.
67. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4(b)(1)(2) (West 2004). The domestic part-
ners must demonstrate financial interdependence "by at least one of the fol-
lowing: (a) a joint deed, mortgage agreement or lease; (b) a joint bank account;
(c) designation of one of the persons as a primary beneficiary in the other per-
son's will; (d) designation of one of the persons as a primary beneficiary in the
other person's life insurance policy or retirement plan; or (e) joint ownership of
a motor vehicle." Id.
68. Id. § 26:8A-4.
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to structure their ongoing relationship was balanced by lesser
license on termination, New Jersey, for example, now requires
domestic partners to undergo a termination procedure similar
to a divorce, although the partners are not afforded the same
rights. 69
The requirements of actual cohabitation in a shared resi-
dence and commingled finances are quite typical of most do-
mestic partner registries.7 0 Ascriptive or functional recognition
schemes may also weigh additional requirements, such as that
a couple be monogamous or be known as a couple to family and
neighbors. Which is a greater restriction on my ability freely to
structure my life with my partner-the requirement that I
must marry that partner and on rare occasions produce the
marriage license to third parties, or the requirement that we
must reside together, be sexually faithful to one another, com-
mingle our finances, hold ourselves out to the world as a couple,
and provide to third parties the details of how we live our lives,
as domestic partnership ordinances and judicially enforced
"functional" family definitions often require? But for the linger-
ing cloud of repressive history hanging over marriage, it would
be clear that marriage today provides far more license, and has
the potential to be far more flexible, liberatory, and egalitarian
than most available alternatives. 7 1
In other respects, too, the developing domestic partnership
laws in the United States are not providing the range of options
69. Id. § 26:8A-10. While dissolution requirements for domestic partner-
ships have been getting more restrictive, not only by statute as in New Jersey,
but in proposals such as the ALI's, married couples have been granted increas-
ing license to enter into binding prenuptial agreements governing the terms
applicable on dissolution. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 59, at 36-37, §§ 6.02,
6.05, 6.06.
70. Path dependence helps account for some restrictive features, given
that most early recognition schemes for domestic partnership, such as those
set up by employers offering benefits to the partners of employees, wished to
avoid free riding and fraud, and, therefore, in the absence of the legally bind-
ing commitments a marriage license produced, substituted inquiry into the
specific facts of the couple's interrelationship. Given that state registration
schemes such as California's now do impose substantial legal obligations-the
obligations of a spouse-on partners, additional restrictions such as cohabita-
tion no longer are needed as a proxy for commitment, but only serve to force
couples into a traditional form as the price for recognition.
71. Of course, the law is not the only constraint placed on couples. It may
well be that no matter how much license the law gives married couples to
structure their lives, societal expectations and traditions, which envelop mar-
riage far more than they do domestic partnership, will leave married persons
comparatively constrained.
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Ettelbrick and I might wish for. To begin with, only marriage in
Massachusetts is open on the same terms to all couples regard-
less of sex. All other states to date who offer any formal legal
recognition at all to same-sex couples have set up separate re-
gimes for them and put those regimes off limits to the mine run
of male-female couples. Unless one of them is a senior citizen, a
male-female couple is ineligible for either the New Jersey or
the California domestic partnership registry. Same-sex couples,
by contrast are limited to domestic partnership in those states
and denied the opportunity to marry. 72 In Vermont 73 and Con-
necticut, 74 although civil union offers "all the same benefits,
protections and responsibilities under [state] law ... as are
granted to spouses in a marriage,"75 only same-sex couples may
form civil unions. As I have previously argued, 76 these bifur-
cated regimes send a message of subordination to both gays
and lesbians on the one hand and heterosexual women on the
other, while reaffirming patriarchy. Withholding from same-sex
couples the opportunity to marry devalues their unions both
symbolically and practically, while restricting marriage to
male-female couples and male-female couples to marriage
forces women who wish to unite themselves to men under state
law to do so in an institution whose legal history is one of sub-
ordinating wives both practically and symbolically, an institu-
tion reserved for them alone because of and not in spite of its
"traditional" (i.e., patriarchal) significance. Although the ex-
pressive harm may come most sharply into focus when the legal
regimes differ in little but name (as in Vermont and Connecti-
cut), the addition of substantive and procedural differences (as
72. Similarly, the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries law is open only to cou-
ples who are otherwise unmarried and 'legally prohibit[ed] from marrying one
another," that is to say to all same-sex couples, but only to those male-female
couples too closely related to one another to marry. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572C-4 (2003).
73. VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204(a) (2004).
74. See An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10,
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/act/Pa/2005PA-00010-ROOSB-00963-
PA.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
75. VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204(a).
76. See Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's
Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 765, 788-89 (2002). For further discussion, see Mary
Anne Case, What Stake Do Heterosexual Women Have in the Same-Sex Mar-
riage/ Domestic Partnership/ Civil Union Debates?, an unpublished paper on
file with the author.
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in California and New Jersey) additionally increases complica-
tion and confusion. 77
Moreover, instead of increasing the range and menu of op-
tions available to a given couple, states like California are fo-
cused on keeping options limited. Consider the changes re-
cently made to the laws applicable to couples registered in
California as domestic partners. From the time the first state-
wide partner registry went into effect on January 1, 2000, the
State has gradually increased the benefits and obligations of
such partners. As of January 2002, such partners had rights
including access to stepparent adoption procedures and wrong-
ful death suits, as well as medical decision making, sick leave,
and insurance benefits, on account of a partner. The most re-
cent change, effective January 1, 2005, conveyed to domestic
partners virtually all the state-level rights and responsibilities
of marriage. 78 Previously registered partners were, however,
presented by the new law with an up-or-out choice. Either they
dissolved their partnership before January 1, 2005 or they were
automatically subject to the new regime of benefits and bur-
dens. Not made available was the option of remaining with the
bundle of rights and obligations available under the earlier re-
gime. In other words, although the size may have grown larger
over time, domestic partnership in California remains one size
fits all. Not only could young heterosexual couples never avail
themselves of the more limited form of partnership provided to
same-sex couples before 2005, even same-sex couples can do so
no longer.
Had California intended its laws to provide options and al-
ternatives, it would have followed the example of the Nether-
lands. That country, which began by gradually granting certain
rights to cohabiting same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples,
first allowed these couples to register their partnership in 1998,
and then, as of 2001, allowed same-sex couples to marry. But,
unlike California, the Netherlands opened registered partner-
77. Among the many difficulties caused are those associated with viola-
tion of the principle of numerus clausus. I am grateful to Lee Anne Fennell for
first urging me to focus on these difficulties. For an explanation of the princi-
ple, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardiza-
tion in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
4 (2000).
78. For an overview of the changes over time to domestic partnership law
in California, see, e.g., MARY KEARNY STROUBE, I Do... DON'T I? A GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING THE CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC PARTNER RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES ACT FOR COUPLES AND PROFESSIONALS (2005).
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ship to opposite-sex as well as same-sex couples. And, also
unlike California, it did not abolish older options when it made
new ones available. Thus both unregistered and registered
partnership and marriage are now available to all. For at least
a five-year period, registered partnership and marriage will
both exist as options for Dutch couples of any sex. "The rela-
tively high number of different-sex couples that contracted a
registered partnership in 1998 ... make[s] it plausible that
there is a need for a marriage-like institution devoid of the
symbolism attached to marriage. Therefore, the [Dutch] gov-
ernment wants to keep the institution of registered partnership
in place, for the time being."79
To understand better what a genuine menu of options for
relationships might look like, as well as how thin the legal con-
ception of marriage in the United States has come to be and
why it nevertheless may be useful for the state to stay involved
in licensing marriage, consider a final analogy, between mar-
riage licenses and corporate charters. Corporate charters in the
United States used to be issued only to the favorites of the state
and only for a limited number of enumerated worthy purposes,
but, like marriage licenses, gradually became available to al-
most anyone and for purposes the state no longer required be
enumerated or inquired into so long as they were lawful. Over
time as well, the menu of options for those starting a business
has increased. In addition to an increasing variety of corporate
forms, they could choose from among noncorporate forms such
as partnership, without, in the mine run of cases, having the
state dictate a form. They could also choose a state in which to
incorporate, even if that state were not their principal place of
business. A similar range of flexibility is not yet available to
couples, but perhaps it should be.80
79. Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage
Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
437, 457-58 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001) (translating the
explanatory memorandum accompanying the original bill on the opening up of
marriage for same-sex partners, Parliamentary Papers II 1998/1999, 26672,
No. 3 (July 8, 1999)). For a discussion of the development of the Dutch law, see
id. at 437-64; YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF GAY PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
111-29 (2002).
80. Unfortunately, the range of options available to unmarried couples,
whether of the same or of different sexes, may in very important respects be
shrinking rather than expanding. At the start of 2004, virtually all states al-
lowed members of cohabiting couples to enforce certain obligations toward one
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Compared with that of marriage, the legal history of the
corporation is infinitely shorter, simpler, and more complete.8 '
In a few brief centuries, Anglo-American corporate law was
born; faced resistance and some growing pains; and reached
what most regard as a fairly satisfactory equilibrium, subject to
comparatively trivial variations, a few minor open questions,
and some carping around the edges. By contrast, the law of
marriage is now, and has been for millennia, an unstable and
unsatisfactory morass.8 2 Over the same quarter century that
saw the ascendancy of the contractual theory of the corpora-
tion, scholars of family law, like Hamlet and Polonius studying
the clouds,88 have debated without resolution the most appro-
priate legal analogy for marriage, with partnership,8 4 con-
tract,8 5 and labor law considered and rejected both normatively
and descriptively. Meanwhile the law of marriage, as usual,
has been in flux: the same quarter century, like the millennia
that preceded it, saw wide swings of the pendulum on many
fundamental questions concerning the formation, dissolution,
and incidents of marriage.
If the law of marriage has failed to reach equilibrium, this
is in part because the sorts of enterprises marriage entails
carry with them far more social and emotional, moral, and reli-
gious weight than those engaged in by corporations. But it is
another by express or implied contract and to obtain benefits as a couple from
third parties such as employers. As part of the backlash against same-sex
marriage, a spate of state constitutional amendments and laws has thrown the
previously settled expectations of such couples into disarray. No one yet knows
how the variously phrased prohibitions on recognition of relationships other
than marriage will be interpreted. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("[Ihe
union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement
recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.").
81. In addition to conversations with Paul Mahoney and Dan Fischel, I
rely for my sense of the history of Anglo-American corporate law principally on
James Willard Hurst's THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970 (1970) and H.A. Shannon's The
Coming of General Limited Liability, 6 ECON. HIST. 267 (1931).
82. This is intended as a purely descriptive assertion. Dissatisfaction with
the law of marriage seems to be a universal, although the reasons for this dis-
satisfaction vary widely over time and across the ideological spectrum.
83. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. ii, at 379-88 (Tucker
Brooke & Jack Randall Crawford eds., Yale Univ. Press 1947).
84. See, e.g., Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under
No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).
85. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:
A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982).
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also, in my view, because the law of marriage has not yet fin-
ished evolving. It is my contention that the law of marriage has
followed a trajectory similar to the law of corporations, but with
a substantially more gradual arc, so that the trajectory is not
yet complete. The path covered by the law of corporations in a
few centuries parallels that of Anglo-American marriage law
over the last millennium. For both marriage and the corpora-
tion, a pivotal point is the eighteenth century, in which the
state made its most aggressive attempt to assert monopoly con-
trol over both institutions, through Lord Hardwicke's Act and
the Bubble Act, respectively. In the case of the corporation, that
attempt was rapidly acknowledged to be a failure. The state
then co-cpted the private network of contracts it had begun by
resisting. The end result was more state control than in a world
of purely private ordering, but much more flexibility than in
the original state-sponsored status institution. Marriage today
seems to be where corporations were in the nineteenth century,
and one optimistic vision for its future is that it complete the
trajectory followed by the law of corporations, co-opting com-
petitors8 6 by moving closer to a system of default rules within
which couples can structure their own lives.8 7 Admitting same-
sex couples to civil marriage could be an important step in mov-
ing that trajectory forward.
It is at least equally uncertain in the case of marriage as in
that of corporations whether state involvement to date has
done more harm than good. But the thought experiment of
imagining the development of marriage over the last several
centuries without the state's strong concessionary and regula-
tory involvement requires speculation about a different evolu-
tionary path for a wide variety of substantive and procedural
legal rules. This is so even though all aspects of the law as to
86. Among them, domestic partnership and express and implied contracts
for cohabitation.
87. Contrary to popular assumption, this would not necessarily entail a
weakening of marital ties. The current marital status regime limits a couple's
ability to opt in as well as to opt out of obligations. Couples generally cannot,
for example, opt into enforcement of the vows recited on their wedding day;
they generally do not have an option to get, in effect, expectation damages for
the breach of such promises as to remain together for richer, for poorer, in
sickness and in health, forsaking all others. If couples were more free to struc-
ture their relationship, some might choose a structure that moves closer to
making available reliance or expectation damages (as with other personal ser-
vice contracts, not specific performance). For further elaboration of this point,
see Mary Anne Case, Comments on Cohabitation After Marvin (1996 AALS
Annual Meeting, tape on file with the AALS, transcript on file with author).
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which the legal institution of marriage was once thought to be
central, notably the legal relationship between parents and
their children8 8 and the criminal law governing sex acts, 89 have
now evolved away from a dependence on marriage. The thought
experiment of eliminating state-sponsored marriage, 90 like that
of eliminating state chartering of corporations, may have little
practical value. While it is theoretically possible with some
changes in the law to achieve through a network of private con-
tract many of the benefits of marriage, marriage may have
some efficiency advantages, especially given how much of the
law is currently structured around it.91 But the involvement of
88. The legal rights and duties of parents with respect to their children
under current American law are increasingly independent of whether a child's
parents are now or have ever been married to one another. But see Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (up-
holding against a due process challenge the conclusive presumption that a
child born to a married woman residing with her husband is a child of the
marriage and thus depriving the biological father of any opportunity to claim
legal rights with respect to the child). Marital and nonmarital fathers (albeit
under somewhat different procedural constraints) can have imposed on them
the same obligations of support and can obtain the same rights, from custody
and visitation to inheritance. This is, of course, a substantial change from the
days when an illegitimate son was fillius nullius.
89. Thus the laws of fornication and adultery, sex crimes that depended
on the marital status of the participants, are in desuetude or have been abol-
ished throughout the country. And, while the law of rape in many jurisdictions
still does take into consideration whether victim and perpetrator are married
to one another, the evolution of the law of rape is away from the classic defini-
tion of rape as forcible and nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a woman
not one's wife. This evolution is not only by way of allowing charges of marital
rape, but also by occasionally extending the marital privilege to unmarried co-
habitants or lovers.
90. It is important to note that, when I speak in this Lecture of the aboli-
tion of marriage or the prospect that "we will have no more marriage,"
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 83, sc. i, at 150-51, I am not speaking of an end to
long-term voluntary unions of couples drawn together by such things as love
and affection, sexual attraction, and the desire to make a shared life. Nor am I
speaking of the institution of marriage as established in various religions.
Marriage in both of these senses existed long before the state claimed any role
and would doubtless survive even the complete withdrawal of the state from
the field. What is at issue in this Lecture is only the role of the state in the
formation, governance, and dissolution of marriage.
91. This was the conclusion of the Report of the Hawaii Commission on
Sexual Orientation and the Law, which endorsed marriage as a more efficient
way than alternatives, including private contract and domestic partnership, of
extending to same-sex couples the benefits and burdens Hawaii and federal
law now extend to those who marry. See STATE OF HAWAII, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW ch. 2 (1995), available at
http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts95/sol (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). The Com-
mission listed among the many benefits of marriage embodied in the law re-
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the state in marriage has also led to numerous inefficiencies, as
an examination of its history demonstrates.92
Like corporate status, civil marriage today serves as an off-
the-rack rule. Its principal legal function, at least while the re-
lationship is ongoing, may not be to structure relations between
the members of the marital couple, but instead to structure
their relations with third parties; to license not just a select
group of worthy activities or individuals, but almost anyone to
do almost anything otherwise legally permissible. Justice De-
nise Johnson's opinion in Baker v. Vermont puts this point well:
This case concerns the secular licensing of marriage. The State's in-
terest in licensing marriages is regulatory in nature .... The regula-
tory purpose of the licensing scheme is to create public records for the
orderly allocation of benefits, imposition of obligations, and distribu-
tion of property through inheritance. Thus, a marriage license merely
acts as a trigger for state-conferred benefits. In granting a marriage
license, the State is not espousing certain morals, lifestyles, or rela-
tionships, but only identifying those persons entitled to the benefits of
the marital status.93
Like corporate charters, marriage licenses used to function
as a grant of monopoly. Not only did members of a marital cou-
ple have a bilateral monopoly on the use of each other's sex or-
gans, 94 but marriage more generally had monopoly control over
sexual activity given that there was, in most U.S. states until
quite recently, no legal means of having sex outside of mar-
riage-laws prohibited adultery, fornication, sodomy, and other
"unnatural" sex acts, lewd, and lascivious conduct. Marriage
also gave husbands a form of monopoly control over children
tirement benefits, health insurance benefits, state and federal tax advantages,
inheritance rights, spousal support, hospital visitation, divorce, confidential
privilege, wrongful death actions, and the right to decide the disposition of the
body of one's spouse. See id. A state constitutional amendment prevented Ha-
waii from opening marriage to same-sex couples, but the state provided "cer-
tain rights and benefits [previously] available only to married couples to cou-
ples composed of individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under
state law" through its Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572C (2003).
92. That history is examined in greater detail in Case & Mahoney, supra
note 38.
93. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 898-99 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
94. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT tit. I, ch. 27 (W. Hastie
trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887) (defining marriage as "the
union of two persons of different sex for life-long reciprocal possession of their
sexual faculties"), available at http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/
Immanuelkl6sr/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
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born to their wives during marriage at a time when children
were seen as belonging in the first instance to their father.95
Both descriptively in present day American law and in my
own normative view, the laws governing marriage today are far
more like those governing business corporations than those
governing nonprofits. What I mean by this is that we do not
only license those marriages entered into only for certain enu-
merated or even only for worthy purposes. We ask little more of
incorporators and couples marrying than that they comply with
otherwise applicable law. To the extent that anything remains
of government promotion of "human goods" 96 through marriage
or incorporation, it is the assumption that the social good is
likely to be promoted when government facilitates people work-
ing together to achieve joint ends. Perhaps at some extremely
high level of generality this accords with the scriptural injunc-
tion that "two are better than one, because they have a good
reward for their labor,"97 but it is hardly a thick and rich ethi-
cal vision that is presently being given state sponsorship.
Consider a further analogy-between the law of corporate
bankruptcy and the law of divorce. The aim of corporate bank-
ruptcy law these days 98 is not to minimize the number of bank-
ruptcies but to see that assets are put to productive use, to see
that those firms that should fail do so expeditiously and with a
minimum of dead-weight loss and those that have a chance of
succeeding be given the time and flexibility they may need to
do so. It is no accident that the notion of a "fresh start" is com-
mon today in both individual bankruptcy and divorce. 99 More-
over, the notion that failure is shameful, however much it may
95. For further discussion, see Case, supra note 46.
96. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward a
Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 46 (1992) ('We
should extend the right of privacy to homosexuals to acknowledge that homo-
sexual relationships often embody many of the same human goods present in
heterosexual relations, not because homosexual relations share with marriage
the morally empty feature of being forms of self-definition.").
97. Ecclesiastes 4:9.
98. I rely for my understanding of these aims principally on conversations
with Douglas Baird.
99. In making this descriptive observation I do not mean to endorse the
full extent to which the perceived desirability of a fresh start informs the law
of divorce nor thereby to reject out of hand the many thoughtful feminist sug-
gestions for reform. See, e.g, Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Jus-
tice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a
New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994).
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still permeate social norms attached to business or marital dis-
solution, no longer forms part of the law in these areas. 10 0
Paradoxically, this limited (some would say amoral) de-
scriptive and normative view of the aims of state-sponsorship of
marriage may provide a strong brake to the slide down the
slippery slope toward polygamy to which opponents of same-sex
marriage so often point a cautionary finger. If I am right that
the principal function of state-sponsored marriage in our law is
to provide an off-the-rack rule to structure certain relations be-
tween members of the couple and third parties (at least this is
the part of marriage that is these days most difficult to achieve
by other means, such as private contract), then recognizing po-
lygamous unions could not easily be justified under existing
law by the best arguments used in support of same-sex mar-
riage. This is because much of what a marriage license now ac-
complishes-i.e., the designation, without elaborate contract-
ing, paperwork or other complications, of a single other person
third parties can look to in a variety of legal contexts, could not
be achieved as neatly if more than two persons are involved.
Rather, with more than two persons, one is almost necessarily
in a realm closer to contract or at least of choice among multi-
ple options with no clear default choice. Take one everyday ex-
ample, medical decision making in the event of incapacity. If a
single spouse is recognized, the hospital knows to whom to
turn; not so if several, with competing visions and agendas,
come forward.
Among the chief functions civil marriage today serves is as
a series of reciprocal default designations-I designate you, my
spouse, and you designate me, at least as a default, as the an-
swer to a wide variety of questions from "Who shall make deci-
sions in the event of incapacity?" to "Who shall determine the
disposal of the body on death?" The convenient opportunity it
affords for simple reciprocal pointing by one spouse at the other
and back makes efficiency, that virtue beloved of the law and
economics community, perhaps the best justification both for
the state's continuing involvement in licensing marriage and
100. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menance of Roman Law and
the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1873-83
(1996). Just as the law required proof of one of a limited and enumerated set of
fault grounds as a precondition for divorce, so, under early English statutes, "a
person was still only subject to bankruptcy if he performed certain prohibited
acts." See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,
and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 34-39 (1986).
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the state's ability, if it wishes, to stop at two in setting the
number of partners for a marriage. But just as, these days, the
state makes available various corporate and partnership forms
to persons organizing their businesses, without, in the mine
run of situations, expressing a normative preference for which
form is chosen, so perhaps the state should similarly leave to
individuals the choice of structure for their personal lives, even
while it continues to offer its assistance when it is helpful in
matters such as registration and default rules.101
Although today the mutual pointing over by members of a
married couple at each other is largely only by default and per-
fectly reciprocal, in 1970, it was far more mandatory and
asymmetrical. In their jurisdictional statement to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Baker and McConnell note that "they were asked
orally at the time of application which was to be the bride and
which was to be the groom. .. [although] the forms for applica-
tion for a marriage license did not inquire as to the sex of the
applicants"'102 and although they "were not questioned as to
which physical sex classification they belonged."'103 The clerk
did ask, however, "Where is the female in this marriage?"'10 4
and a reporter waiting outside the county clerk's office insisted
on knowing "'who's going to be the wife.'. . .'We don't play those
kind of roles' came the reply."'1 5 The Look magazine spread on
the couple, in an issue dedicated to The American Family, rein-
forced this answer, observing:
In many respects, the Baker-McConnell household is like that of any
young marrieds except that there is no male-female role playing. Nei-
101. Some readers might be anxious to insist here that the state also re-
tains an interest in regulating both business and intimate relationships to
avoid oppression or unfairness to one of the parties or to third parties. Of
course it does, but vindicating this interest can be a conceptually distinct mat-
ter from the question of state provision of a licensing scheme. Even in the ab-
sence of a licensing or registration scheme, the state can monitor relations be-
tween intimates as well as business associates, for example for unconsciona-
bility or fraud. And even when a licensing scheme is in place, the state may
decline to intervene in the licensed relationships to ensure fairness. See, e.g.,
McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) ("The living standards of
a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for the courts to de-
termine, even though the husband's attitude toward his wife, according to his
wealth and circumstances, leaves little to be said on his behalf.").
102. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)
(No. 71-1027).
103. Alternative Writ of Mandamus, Hennepin County District Court, Ju-
risdictional Statement at 11a, Baker (No. 71-1027).
104. TOBIN & WICKER, supra note 20, at 145.
105. Id.
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ther is a limp-wristed sissy. "I do the dishes," says Baker, "because I
don't like to cook." "And I do the cooking," says McConnell, "because I
cook better than Jack." Expenses are usually split four ways between
Baker, McConnell and the young architect and lawyer who share the
pad. Baker, as befits a man with a business degree, keeps the finan-
cial records in a stenographer's notebook, and keeps an eye out for
bargains in the supermarket.1o 6
The repudiation of sex-roles was reaffirmed in the couple's
wedding ceremony, when, dressed in identical white knit suits,
one said to the other, "Touch me, I am your lover, brother, sis-
ter, and friend."107 At the time, the Minnesota law governing
the solemnization of marriages specified that "no particular
form shall be required, except that the parties shall declare in
the presence of a person authorized ... to solemnize marriages,
and the attending witnesses that they take each other as hus-
band and wife."10 8 It is important to remember that, in 1970,
more than a form of words was legally at stake and the re-
porter's question as to which one would be the wife could be far
more than a facetious put-down or an inquiry into potential ef-
feminacy. Which one would be the wife had serious legal conse-
quences at a time when legally enforced sex-role differentiation
in marriage was firmly entrenched in law and not yet seen as
constitutionally problematic. 10 9
The wife, after all, was the one to whose household services
the husband was entitled, such that her loss, not necessarily
106. Star, supra note 7, at 69, 70. There is evidence that Baker was willing
to play with stereotypes of gay men as effeminate or androgynous in a poster
for his successful campaign for president of the University of Minnesota Stu-
dent Association, which depicted him "in a shirt and tie and jeans [and] a
woman's high heeled shoes" with the slogan "Put Yourself in Jack Baker's
Shoes." See DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE
STRUGGLE To BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 71 (1999).
107. TOBIN & WICKER, supra note 20, at 150. At the risk of stating the ob-
vious, let me note how perfectly these identical outfits combined the bride's
traditional color with the groom's traditional garb.
108. MINN. STAT. § 517.09, quoted in Jurisdictional Statement at 6a, Baker
(No. 71-1027). Like so many of the legal technicalities surrounding the obtain-
ing and use of McConnell and Baker's Blue Earth County marriage license, it
is unclear whether this technical requirement was complied with in the sol-
emnization. To comply with a similar requirement in California law, Reverend
Troy Perry, the Metropolitan Community Church leader who, on June 12,
1970 performed "what The Advocate termed 'the first marriage in the nation
designed to legally bind two persons of the same sex"' had one of the two
woman declare that she took her partner "to serve in the office of husband"
while the other "made the same vow except to say 'wife' instead of 'husband."'
TEAL, supra note 52, at 282-83.
109. Although not all the legal consequences described below were part of
Minnesota law in 1970.
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his, gave rise to a claim for loss of consortium by the survivor;
the process by which state courts and legislatures made consor-
tium claims reciprocal was still underway in 1970.110 The wife
was the one presumed to be dependent, and who as a result
could be eligible and make her husband eligible for benefits; not
until a series of cases beginning with Frontiero v. Richardson
in 1973 did the U.S. Supreme Court begin to dismantle on con-
stitutional grounds the asymmetry in law between what a wife
was entitled to on account of her husband and what a husband
was entitled to on account of his wife.111 The wife was the one
the husband was obligated to support during marriage and who
could be entitled to alimony on divorce; not until Orr v. Orr in
1979 did the Supreme Court insist that husbands be eligible for
alimony equally with wives, holding that the state's purpose of
reinforcing a model of "allocation of family responsibilities un-
der which the wife plays a dependent role.. . can no longer jus-
tify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender."112 The
wife was also the one whose share of jointly owned property
could be disposed of by her husband as "head and master" of
the marital community without her knowledge or consent; not
until Kirchberg v. Feenstra in 1981 did the U.S. Supreme Court
hold that state statutes giving the husband such exclusive con-
trol violated the Equal Protection Clause." 3
As stunning as the declaration that a "homosexual is... a
human being, and a citizen .... as much entitled to the protec-
tion and benefits of the laws and due process fair treatment as
are others," made by the district judge considering McConnell's
challenge to his denial of employment by the University of
Minnesota library' 14 was the proposition that "[a] woman is a
'person' entitled to the equal protection of the laws against in-
vidious discrimination on the basis of sex," a proposition the
American Veterans Committee and the NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund had to remind the Supreme Court of in
110. Minnesota wives had been accorded claims for loss of consortium be-
fore 1970, see Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 170 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn. 1969),
but, as late as 1977, a Minnesota treatise noted that this remained one of the
'legal remedies unavailable [to wives] in most States." ELLEN DRESSELHUIS,
THE LEGAL STATUS OF HOMEMAKERS IN MINNESOTA 6 (1977).
111. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973).
112. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (striking down an Alabama
statute providing alimony on divorce only to wives, never husbands).
113. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459-60 (1981).
114. McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd,
451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
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their brief in Reed v. Reed, nearly a year after Baker and
McConnell first applied for a marriage license. 115
It is crucially important to remember that Baker and
McConnell's legal challenge to the sex distinctions in the mar-
riage laws began before the U.S. Supreme Court had held any
sex-respecting rule to be constitutionally problematic and
ended before the now well-established doctrinal structure gov-
erning claims of denial of equal protection on grounds of sex
was put in place by that Court. Thirty-five years and two dozen
Supreme Court cases later, it is well-established that "fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females"
116
are forbidden under U.S. constitutional law as a basis for state
action.
In his legal opinion recommending the denial of a license to
the couple, Hennepin County Attorney George Scott stressed
the fact that, if one assumed from the issuance of a marriage
license:
that the parties receiving such license are to become married to one
another, there is another great body of law which takes effect over
such parties as being married to one another .... The distinctions be-
tween a husband and wife, a man and a woman, and the rights and
duties which are placed upon each ... are too numerous to set forth in
this opinion. Suffice it to say that both our statutory and case law in
the State of Minnesota is replete with references to the distinction of
husband and wife as being male and female with different rights, du-
ties and obligations accorded to each. 117
According to Scott, "if one were to permit the marriage of two
male persons, it would result in a complete confusion as to the
rights and duties of husband and wife, man and woman, in the
numerous other sections of our law which govern the rights and
duties of married persons" and "result in an undermining and
destruction of the entire legal concept of our family structure in
all areas of law."118 As of 1970 these claims might well have
115. Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Committee, Inc. and
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at i, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (No. 70-4).
116. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
117. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Brief at 12-13, Baker v. Nel-
son, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (No. 71-1027). Scott listed "the area of di-
vorce, the probate code, inheritance and income tax statutes, husband and
wife, public welfare, and many others." Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 21; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at RA-3, McConnell
v. Anderson, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972) (No. 71-978); Homosexual Marriage License
Denial Urged, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, May 23, 1970, at 5A. The prospect that
their marriage would "'force the legislature to take a fresh look at a lot of stat-
utes on the books"' and that "'it definitely helps women's liberation'.., by call-
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had merit. In the interim, of course, virtually all the laws that
speak in a legally differentiated way in terms of husband and
wife, except those governing entry into civil marriage, have
been "undermin[ed] and destroy[ed]" by the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions holding such differentiation an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of equal protection on grounds of sex.119 In
ways not foreseen by the Minnesota Supreme Court as it de-
cided Baker,120 the Fourteenth Amendment was indeed "a char-
ter for restructuring" the "historic institution" of marriage so as
to guarantee to men and women the equal protection of the
laws.
Thirty-five years after Scott recommended denying a mar-
riage license to a couple of males, another County Attorney in
another state, Agnes Sowle of Multnomah County, Oregon, re-
lying on the jurisprudence that had developed in the interim,
declared instead that "[r]efusal to issue marriage licenses to
same sex couples" would be an unconstitutional denial to them
of equal state privileges and immunities. 121 As a result, more
ing into question laws that treat husbands and wives unequally" was a plus
for Baker, who, with McConnell, "both wear women's liberation buttons." See
TOBIN & WICKER, supra note 20, at 153.
119. For the Supreme Court to say that embodying sex-based role differen-
tiation in the law of marriage is no longer constitutionally permissible is by no
means to outlaw legal rules based on role differentiation in marriage, however.
Indeed, the claim Baker and McConnell brought for veterans' spousal benefits
in the 1970s clearly depended on such differentiation, as did their recent ap-
plication for a tax refund. There may not have been a "wife" in the
Baker/McConnell marriage, but there was a "dependent spouse," McConnell v.
Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), under the statutes gov-
erning veterans benefits in 1971 and a secondary earner under the tax code in
2000. Had there not been, there would have been no point to the couple's
bringing suit. Equal earning couples get a marriage penalty, not a refund, for
changing their tax status to "married, filing jointly." See McConnell v. United
States, No. 04-2711, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1313 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005). And
increased benefits were only awarded to veterans whose spouses depended fi-
nancially on them. There might be objections from a feminist or other stand-
point to the extent to which the law, particularly the tax law, disfavors equal
earning couples and encourages marital role differentiation along the lines of
the traditional role differentiation of husband and wife. But the importance of
"fixed roles" in marriage no longer being legally assignable by sex should not
be underestimated. Precisely because from time to time they may play differ-
ent roles, without "male-female role playing" and despite both being men,
Baker and McConnell in their spousal relationship embody the mandate
against "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of men and women."
120. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
121. Confidential Memorandum from Agnes Sowle, County Attorney of
Multnomah County, Oregon (Mar. 2, 2004), available at http://pub.bna.comfll
sowleopn.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
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than 3000 same-sex couples in Multnomah County were issued
the license denied Baker and McConnell by Hennepin County,
Minnesota. 122
Importantly, the cases County Attorney Sowle relied on
were state constitutional cases, from her home state of Oregon,
but also from Massachusetts and Vermont; her opinion dis-
cussed no federal constitutional claims. 123 Under the circum-
stances facing proponents of same-sex marriage today, the exis-
tence of the precedent of Baker v. Nelson, appeal dismissed, is a
double-edged sword. Notwithstanding the massive tectonic
shift in the constitutional law of discrimination on grounds of
sex since Baker and McConnell's appeal was dismissed, the de-
cision in their case retains some precedential value, albeit less
than that to be accorded a decision reached after briefing and
argument. 124 Some might still criticize the couple for having
sued too soon, allowing the creation of a bad precedent to block
state and lower federal courts from developing, on the basis of
Supreme Court cases decided in the interim, federal due proc-
ess and equal protection claims which, whatever their status in
1971, are nothing if not "substantial" today.
In the peculiar political climate surrounding same-sex
marriage, it may not be regrettable that federal claims can be
dodged while state constitutional jurisprudence develops, how-
ever. Like Justice Scalia, I can see no principled way under ex-
isting constitutional doctrine to avoid the conclusion that de-
122. Although in Li v. State, CC 0403-03057 et al., 2005 WL 852319 (Or.
Apr. 14, 2005), the Oregon Supreme Court held that Multnomah County's de-
cision to take Sowle's advice and issue licenses to same-sex couples exceeded
the county's authority under state law, it did not evaluate the merits of
Sowle's privileges and immunities analysis. On Election Day 2004, the voters
of Oregon passed a constitutional amendment declaring, "It is the policy of
Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man
and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage." OR. CONST.
art. XV, § 5a.
123. See Confidential Memorandum from Agnes Sowle, supra note 121, at
4-5 (citing Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)). A concurrence in Vermont's Baker
decision had, in turn, invoked the Oregon court's analysis in Hewitt v. State
Accident Insurance Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982), and Tanner v. Oregon
Health Sciences University, 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), for the proposi-
tions that classifications on the basis of respectively sex and sexual orientation
were suspect. Baker, 744 A.2d at 892-93 (Dooley, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 477 n.20 (1979) (describing such decisions as "no
more than a view that the judgment appealed from was correct as to those
federal questions raised and necessary to the decision").
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nial of license to marry merely on the ground that both parties
are of the same sex is unconstitutional. Scalia draws this con-
clusion from his reading of the majority's opinion in Lawrence
v. Texas.125 I am of the view that, long before Lawrence, the Su-
preme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence compelled the
same result.126 The same sense of legal inevitability and politi-
cal controversy overshadowed the question of the constitution-
ality of bans on interracial marriage in the years before Loving
v. Virginia, leading the Supreme Court to employ specious pro-
cedural objections in order to avoid a decision on the merits in
Naim v. Naim, a 1956 challenge to the very same miscegena-
tion statute the Court was to strike down eleven years later.127
It is worth highlighting that the Supreme Court extended
constitutional equal protection guarantees to interracial sex
three years before it extended those same guarantees to inter-
racial marriage. 128 Similarly, with Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
has now vouchsafed same-sex couples the right to have consen-
sual sex but not to marry. Especially given the historical rela-
tionship between the licensing of marriage and sex in American
law, what does it say about the Court's attitude toward a cou-
ple when the Court finds it easier to protect their sexual activi-
ties than to license their marriage? In resisting the use of the
term "homosexual" in Minnesota's Human Rights Act, which
was to ban certain forms of discrimination on grounds of "ho-
mosexual orientation," Baker objected that "'homosexual' im-
plies strictly sexual activity."12 9 "'[W]e have a right to expect
our government to provide solutions to our problems in a man-
ner that does not deprive us of our dignity as persons,' he
said."1 30 He would probably say to the Justices in the majority
in Lawrence that it is not enough in order that same-sex cou-
ples "retain their dignity as free persons" for the Court "to ac-
125. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
126. See Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns" Con-
stitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1447, 1486-90 (2000).
127. Compare Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955), with Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188-96 (1964), with
Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
129. See Lars Bjornson, Baker Rejects 'Homosexual' in Gay Rights Amend-
ment, THE ADVOCATE, May 23, 1973, at 6. Said Baker, "'I consider that word
insulting, equivalent to and on a par with the word 'cocksucker."' Id.
130. Id.
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knowledge that [as] adults [they] may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own pri-
vate lives." 131 When their sexual "conduct can be but one ele-
ment in a personal bond that is more enduring,"132 their dignity
as free persons also requires them not to be denied a marriage
license.
There is every indication that the current Supreme Court
shares the Naim Court's reluctance to decide the constitutional
question of who may marry. By including, in his majority opin-
ion determining that lack of standing as a parent precluded Mi-
chael Newdow from obtaining a decision on the merits of his
Establishment Clause challenge to the words "under God" in
the Pledge of Allegiance, a long and detailed reaffirmation of
the Court's deference to the states and its custom of declining
"to intervene [in] the realm of domestic relations," Justice Ste-
vens may have bought his brethren time on not just one, but
two, controversial questions, the pledge and same-sex mar-
riage.133 The timing of the Newdow opinion at the height of
congressional consideration of a constitutional amendment and
a jurisdiction-stripping statute both designed to take questions
of same-sex marriage out of the hands of judges, sent the fol-
lowing reassuring signal that at least the Supreme Court was
disinclined to be "activist":
Long ago we observed that "the whole subject of the domestic rela-
tions of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the law of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.". . . We have also ac-
knowledged that it might be appropriate for federal courts to decline
to hear a case involving "elements of the domestic relationship"...
"when a case presents 'difficult questions of state law bearing on pol-
icy problems of substantial public import whose importance tran-
scends the result in the case then at bar."'... Thus, while rare in-
stances arise in which it is necessary to answer a substantial federal
question that transcends or exists apart from the family law issue,
see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, in general it is appropriate for the federal
courts to leave delicate issues of domestic law to the state courts. 34
The signal may be reinforced by the fact that, although the law
"of husband and wife," though not directly relevant to the New-
dow case, is specifically mentioned as reserved to the states,
only Palmore v. Sidoti, not Loving nor any of the Court's consti-
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
132. Id.
133. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2309
(2004).
134. Id. (citations omitted).
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tutional sex discrimination cases concerning state marriage
laws, is cited as the exceptional case requiring intervention into
the state law of domestic relations.
Just as the same evasive solution may, at least temporar-
ily,135 work for the Court in both the pledge and same-sex mar-
riage cases, so the same fear may underlie its desire to duck the
two questions-fear of massive popular resistance, much of it
explicitly rooted in religious principles. In the final sentence of
their brief successfully urging the U.S. Supreme Court to dis-
miss Baker and McConnell's appeal of the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision holding that Hennepin County need not issue
them a marriage license, the Hennepin County attorneys
wrote, "Our country, and its Constitution, were founded upon
basic religious principles and one of the most basic of such
principles is that marriage is an institution ordained by God
and that such institution is to be entered into by a man and a
woman as husband and wife."136
There is every indication that Jack Baker and Michael
McConnell shared the view that "marriage is an institution or-
dained by God." The first of five grounds Baker listed in justify-
ing his right to marry McConnell was:
At two of the three passages [in the Book of Genesis which speak of
marriage], the Bible speaks of marriage in terms of a love bond or a
love union between two people. That's how we look at marriage. We
feel it's the relationship, i.e., the love and concern that is important-
not procreation. We look at marriage as a commandment of God to
love one's companion.... We feel that the state is out of line with
both the Constitution and the Bible to insist that there must be chil-
dren involved or contemplated in a relationship before it will recog-
nize a marriage.... We believe love knows no gender.1
37
Baker, raised Roman Catholic, and McConnell, raised
Southern Baptist, were reported to "never miss Mass at the
[University of Minnesota] campus Catholic chapel"138 during
the years in which they were seeking to obtain a marriage li-
cense.
One Sunday, Baker stunned the worshippers during a sermon about
the openness of Christ in accepting people when he asked the priest:
135. Newdow, unsurprisingly, has gathered together plaintiffs who do not
share his standing problems and is headed back to court.
136. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Brief at 8, Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (No. 71-1027).
137. TEAL, supra note 52, at 283-84 (quoting a letter from Jack Baker to
the author (Oct. 21, 1970) (contrasting Genesis 2:18 and 2:24 with Genesis
1:28)).
138. Star, supra note 7, at 71.
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'Do you feel that if two people give themselves in love to each other
and want to grow together with mutual understanding, that Jesus
would be open to such a union if the people were of the same sex?"...
The priest hesitated a long moment and finally answered: 'Yes. In my
opinion, Christ would be open."139
During the early 1970s, Father William Hunt, chaplain of the
Catholic Newman Center at the University of Minnesota "en-
gaged in friendly public dialogues about homosexuality with
Jack Baker and with clerics of other faiths."140 According to
Hunt, "homosexuality 'was much more threatening to the Bibli-
cal world than to the contemporary world. In my opinion, the
state could well recognize homosexual marriages without lead-
ing to the destruction of marriage, but I am not so sure the
Church should do the same."' 14 1
When it came time actually to solemnize their marriage
pursuant to the license McConnell had obtained from Blue
Earth County, the couple chose Methodist ministers to perform
the ceremony and sign the legal certificate. 142
The differing roles played by Catholic and Protestant
clergy in facilitating the union of Baker and McConnell illumi-
nate both the peculiar relationship between religious and civil
marriage in this country and its connection to one particular
widely voiced objection to state recognition of same-sex mar-
riages, as I shall explain. Note that the Catholic priest voiced
the view that the state could and should recognize same-sex
marriage even though his church could not and that the Meth-
odist minister performed a ceremony that he did everything in
his ministerial 43 power to give both spiritual and legal validity.
It may seem a paradox that the United States, with a
much greater commitment to separation of church and state,
conflates civil and religious marriage to a far greater extent
than some continental European countries in which church-
state cooperation is constitutionally secured. In Germany, for
139. Id.
140. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 106, at 233.
141. Id.; see also Priest Says State, Not Church, Might Sanction Gay Mar-
riages, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 25, 1971, at 13A; St. Paul Clergy, Homosexu-
als Hold 2nd Symposium, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 4, 1972, at 8A.
142. TOBIN & WICKER, supra note 20, at 150 (describing the ceremony be-
ing solemnized by "[a] Methodist minister and friend of the couple, Roger
Lynn"). McConnell recalls, "We were legally married by two Methodist minis-
ters. Both signed the documents, and they were properly filed .... " JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS v. THE
SUPREME COURT 165 (2001).
143. Pun intended.
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example, despite a long and continuing history of close coopera-
tion between church and state on many matters, civil and reli-
gious marriage are kept rigorously separate by law. Only civil
marriage has the force of law and it may be performed only by
a civil registrar. German couples are free to have an entirely
separate religious ceremony performed by clergy, but, this
ceremony "has no legal effect under German law."'144 The pecu-
liar U.S. situation in which members of the clergy, as author-
ized agents of the state, can virtually simultaneously and seam-
lessly perform a ceremony of religious and civil marriage and
the resulting conflation of religious and civil marriage create
many difficulties and confusions under U.S. law. 145 As sug-
gested above by the discussion of Lord Hardwicke's Act, which
not only asserted for the first time the state's monopoly over
marriage, but did so in conjunction with the Established
Church of England,146 the roots of the American conflation be-
tween religious and civil marriage lie deep in Anglo-American
legal history. In Puritan New England, by contrast to the rest
of the United States, members of the clergy came late into par-
ticipation in the licensing of marriage. 147 Marriage in New Eng-
land was from the start a civil contract solemnized by a civil
magistrate, perhaps in imitation of the Dutch model of mar-
riage some colonies' founders had experienced while in Lei-
den.148 It is tempting to see some connection between this his-
144. See, e.g., FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 297 (Carolyn Hammond & Alison
Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002).
145. Consider, for example, that the laws of many states make it a criminal
offense for anyone authorized to perform marriages, including members of the
clergy, to do so in the absence of a valid civil marriage license. A man and
woman who wish to be married in the eyes of their faith, but not of the state,
risk making criminals of clergy who accommodate their wish. Consider, for ex-
ample, a couple of California senior citizens, widow and widower, who wish to
enter only into registered domestic partnership under state law, and not into a
new civil marriage, so as not to lose Social Security, pension, and other bene-
fits accrued through their deceased spouses. If they also wish to avoid living in
sin in the eyes of their faith or to be married to each other under a chuppah,
California makes it difficult for their minister or rabbi legally to accommodate
them because, unlike same-sex couples, these two senior citizens can clearly
enter into a legal marriage. The situation their clergy face is different from
that faced by ministers such as those in New Paltz, New York who claim
themselves called by their faith to perform for same-sex couples marriage
ceremonies they intend to be legally binding notwithstanding an inability to
obtain state marriage licenses.
146. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
147. 2 HOWARD, supra note 32, at 138.
148. Id. at 127-32.
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tory and New England's vanguard role in the state licensing of
same-sex couples, with Vermont the first state to give them the
benefits of marriage through civil union, Massachusetts the
first state to license their marriages, and Connecticut most re-
cently extending civil union to them by legislative initiative
unprompted by court order. 14 9
What is the relationship between the most virulent opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage in the United States and the paradox
that this country, with a much greater commitment to separa-
tion of church and state, conflates civil and religious marriage
to a far greater extent than countries like Germany? Opponents
of state recognition for same-sex marriage often insist that such
recognition would undercut their own, heterosexual marriages,
and are widely mocked in the press and public debates for do-
ing so. I think much can be learned about the peculiarly Ameri-
can way in which marriage is licensed by taking such claims
seriously. In my view, the following is the best explanation of
opposition to legal recognition of same-sex marriage on the part
of evangelical Protestant religious conservatives who claim
such recognition would undercut their own marriages: Unlike
observant Jews and Roman Catholics, who clearly understand
that civil marriage and marriage within their faith are not the
same, such that one can be married in the eyes of the state and
not the faith and vice versa, Protestant denominations in the
United States have essentially abdicated the definition, crea-
tion and, above all the dissolution of marriage to the state.
There is, for example, nothing like the get or annulment avail-
able to or required of Protestants. This leaves religiously con-
servative Protestants far more dependent on the state's regula-
tion of marriage, far less able to distinguish conceptually
between marriage as their religion defines it and as state law
does and, unsurprisingly, far more opposed on a percentage ba-
sis to same-sex marriage than conservative Catholics and Jews
who otherwise, according to poll data, share their opposition to
homosexuality. 150 According to a representative poll taken in
July 2003, for example, while 64% of Protestants oppose "gay
149. An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. Pub. Act No. 05-10,
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/act/Pa/2005PA-00010-ROOSB-00963-
PA.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
150. A fuller account appears in Mary Anne Case, From Before Hard-
wicke's Act to After the Defense of Marriage Act (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author and delivered at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American
Historical Association).
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marriage," "Catholics also oppose it, but by a smaller margin
than the entire population," 50% of Catholics as compared to
55% of the population as a whole. 151 And according to survey
results released by the Pew forum in October 2004, 55% of Jews
supported same-sex marriage, while opposition reached 48%
among white Roman Catholics, "52% among Latino Catholics,
71% among Latino Protestants, 72% among Black Protestants
and 75% among white evangelical Protestants."152
For evangelical Protestants today, therefore, state-licensed
marriage may function in somewhat the same way as state-
sponsored public schools did for Protestants in the past. In each
case a formally secular institution could be put in service of
sectarian ends by groups that substituted capture of the state
institution for development of their own clearly religious alter-
natives. Then, while Catholics and Jews, shut out of state edu-
cation funding, founded private sectarian schools, the curricu-
lum in the ostensibly secular public schools often tended to be
infused with Protestant principles, including readings from the
King James Bible. Accustomed to and dependent on this, some
Protestants, beginning with the nineteenth century Bible
wars1 53 and continuing to this day in a host of Establishment
Clause cases concerning the public schools, 154 resisted mightily
any perceived attempt to make the institution of public educa-
tion more neutral and secular and less clearly an embodiment
of their values. Nowadays, similarly, evangelical Protestants'
dependence on the state to articulate and enforce their view of
marriage is manifest, not only in the zeal with which they seek
to enshrine covenant marriage in state law,155 but, most dra-
151. Poll: Legalize Same-Sex Marriage?, CBSNEWS.COM, July 30, 2003,
at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/30/opinion/polls/main565918.shtml
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Thus, the high percentage of Catholics in Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut may, in an apparent paradox, have combined with
the Puritan heritage of civil marriage to make those states fertile ground for
same-sex couples' claims for license to marry or enter civil unions.
152. Poll: Strong Religious Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage,
ADVOCATE.COM, at http://www.advocate.com/print.article.asp?ID=13661&sd=
09/11/04-09/13/04 (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
153. For further discussion, see, e.g., Linda Przybyszewski, Competing
Theories of Church and State: The Cincinnati Bible War of 1869-1872 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author and delivered at the 2005 Annual Meet-
ing of the American Historical Association).
154. The issues presented in these cases range from the pledge to prayer in
the schools, and from the teaching of evolution to the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments.
155. See, e.g., Scott L. Feld et al., Christian Right as Civil Right: Covenant
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matically, in their comparatively more virulent opposition to
same-sex marriage.
This suggests that disaggregating the religious from the
secular licensing of marriage-producing, in yet another sense,
marriage licenses in the plural, may be at least a useful, if not
a necessary, precondition to settling the question of the civil li-
censing of marriages like Baker and McConnell's, if not "under
God" then in "one nation, with liberty and justice for all."
Marriage and a Kinder, Gentler, Moral Conservatism, 44 REV. OF RELIGIOUS
RES. 173, 178 (2002) (detailing leading role in passing Louisiana's covenant
marriage law of conservative evangelical Protestant activists, including Tony
Perkins, who thought the legislation a "politically more palatable" alternative
to their preferred option of generally reinstituting state laws "limiting access
to divorce and restoring the requirement that someone must be to blame").
The Louisiana covenant marriage law, in addition to tightening divorce re-
quirements for couples who choose it as an option, required of such couples
"premarital counseling from a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious So-
ciety of Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a professional mar-
riage counselor, which counseling shall include a discussion of the seriousness
of covenant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is a
commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling
in times of marital difficulties." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273 A(2)(a) (West
2004). This mobilizes the mechanisms of state law to achieve some of what the
Catholic Church, through the pre-Cana counseling it requires of couples who
seek to marry in the Church, has long done without governmental reinforce-
ment.
